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BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. – THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
TRUMPS THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Sue Ganske *
INTRODUCTION
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 1
As noted by the Tenth Circuit, the issue presented in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. 2 involves a “tale of two statutes.” 3 The first statute is the
Religious Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). 4 The RFRA prohibits
government action that substantially burdens a person’s exercise of
religion. 5 The second statute is the recently enacted Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which made numerous changes to the health
care system. 6 The ACA requires health insurers to provide coverage for
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. When the Hobby Lobby case reached the Supreme Court,
the Court found it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claims raised by Conestoga
Wood Specialties and the Hahns. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2785 (2014).
2. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751.
3. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch,
J. concurring), aff’d sub nom. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
4. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.); see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (2012).
6. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.).
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additional preventive care and screenings as provided by general guidelines
endorsed by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”). 7
Under the ACA, the HRSA commissioned the Institute of Medicine to
develop recommendations for the HSRA guidelines. 8 These included
recommendations that all insurance plans cover all Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approved methods of contraception, sterilization,
patient education, and counseling for all women. 9 The approved methods of
contraception included, but are not limited to: diaphragms, oral
contraceptives, emergency contraceptives, and intrauterine devices. 10
HRSA adopted these recommendations in full, 11 and used these guidelines
when publishing their final rules. 12
According to the ACA, large employers with fifty or more full-time
employees 13 may provide employees with health insurance, 14 or pay a
penalty. 15 Employers with fewer than fifty employees are not required to
provide health insurance coverage under the ACA. 16 As of August 1, 2012,
unless exempted or grandfathered, all employers’ group health plans were
required to conform to the published rules. 17 Grandfathered health insurance

7. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012). Other issues of the ACA have previously been
litigated. In 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2608 (2012), the Court held five to four that the individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(a) (2012), was constitutional as a tax, but not under the Commerce Clause. See
Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 34-40 (2013) (discussing the government’s tax argument and
the plurality opinion in Sebelius); see generally Comment, National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 126
HARV. L. REV. 72 (2012).
8. The Institute of Medicine is an independent non-profit “health arm of the
National Academy of Sciences.”
About the IOM, INST. OF MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last updated Nov. 04, 2013, 10:09 PM).
9. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS,
165 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13181.
10. OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. FOOD. & DRUG ADMIN., Birth Control Guide,
http://www.fda.gove/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/For%E2%80A8Women/Fre
ePublications/UCM356451.pdf (last visited Dec. 02, 2014).
11. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,870 (July 02, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156).
12. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (codifying the final rule).
13. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “applicable large employer”).
14. Id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A); see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2762-64 (2014) (discussing the ACA requirements).
15. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b), 4980H(a) (2012).
16. See id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A).
17. Coverage for Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. at 39,870; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Women’s Preventive
Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands
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plans are not subject to the preventative services provision. 18 Additionally,
certain religious organizations and religious non-profits are exempt from the
requirement to provide contraceptive services. 19
Three for-profit closely held corporations filed two separate suits claiming
that the requirement to cover four of the mandatory twenty contraceptive
methods violated the RFRA. 20 These three for-profit corporations objected,
for religious reasons, to the requirement stating the corporations had to cover
four of the currently required twenty contraceptive methods. 21 The
corporations objected because the four methods could prevent the
implantation of a fertilized egg. 22 These for-profit closely held corporations
employ more than fifty people, are not grandfathered, and are not religious
non-profits, so they did not qualify for any exemption from coverage. 23 In
light of an appellate court split, 24 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether or not the regulations 25 regarding contraception violated
the RFRA. 26 On June 30, 2014, in a five to four decision 27 the Supreme
Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 02, 2014).
18. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed.
Reg. 44,621, 46,623 (Aug. 03, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). A grandfathered
plan is defined as a plan that was in existence on March 23, 2010, and has not undergone
any enumerated changes that would disqualify the plan, such as “elimination of all or
substantially all benefits to diagnose or treat a particular condition.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-1251T(a)(1)(i) (2013); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1211T (2013); 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.140(a).
19. 145 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A)-(B) (2013); Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623-24.
20. Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel Christian bookstores were among the plaintiffs
in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d
and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation was the
plaintiff in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa.
2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of United States Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765-66.
22. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124-25; Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 390.
23. Supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
24. In Hobby Lobby, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a denial of a
preliminary injunction. 723 F.3d at 1147. In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction. 724 F.3d 377 at 417; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16,
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354) (2014) (discussing circuit split).
25. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2013).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
27. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2758 (2014).
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Court held that indeed the requirement to cover the four disputed methods
violated the RFRA. 28
This article examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. 29 and discusses its implications. The Supreme Court’s
ruling is limited, and confined only to closely-held non-profit corporations
that object to the contraceptive mandate, or part of the mandate, for religious
reasons. 30 However, it is possible or even probable that the decision has
opened the door to further litigation on this issue for other employers to
request exemptions under the ACA to follow. Further litigation under the
ACA is pending 31, and is also discussed.
The ACA was a controversial piece of legislation from the very start.
Politicians and commentators alike challenged the individual mandate, 32
contraception coverage, 33 and the establishment of administrative bodies to
administer the law, 34 among other provisions. On June 28, 2012, the
Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality of one piece of the ACA
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 35
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS AND
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

I.

A.

ACA Provision

Under the individual mandate, most Americans were required to purchase
“minimum essential” health insurance or pay a tax penalty. 36 Specifically,
the law required that “[a]n applicable individual shall for each month
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 2785.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Id. at 2785.
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-114, 2014
WL 3817533 (U.S. Nov. 07, 2014).
32. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263
(N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
33. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
34. Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–1714–PHX–GMS, 2012 WL 6674394 (Dec. 20,
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014).
35. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
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essential coverage for such month.” 37 Individuals would be in compliance
with the individual mandate if they were part of a qualifying federal health
care program, had an “employer-sponsored plan,” were participants in a plan
that was “grandfathered” in or, most notably, purchased a “plan offered in
the individual market.” 38
B.

The Decisions Below

On March 23, 2010, the day President Obama signed the ACA into law,
the National Federation of Independent Business, twenty-six states, and two
private individuals challenging the ACA’s individual mandate. 39 The
plaintiffs alleged that the ACA attempted to regulate individuals who were
not active in the health care marketplace and, therefore, outside the reach of
the Commerce Clause. 40
The District Court held that enacting the individual mandate was not a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. 41
The District Court reasoned that “activity” was an essential element to any
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause and Congress’ attempt to
compel participation in the marketplace was outside the scope of that
Clause. 42 The District Court further rejected the government’s claim that a
failure to purchase insurance was itself “activity” because of the unique
nature of the health care marketplace and the profound effect uninsured
individuals have on that marketplace. 43 Thus, the District Court concluded
that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. 44
37. Id.; see id. § 5000A(d)(1) (defining “applicable individual” as anyone who was
not incarcerated, present unlawfully, covered under a “health care sharing ministry.”).
38. Id. § 5000A(f). Under the ACA, individuals who (a) could not afford coverage,
(b) were experiencing hardship, or (c) were members of an Indian tribe were exempt
from the individual mandate. Id. § 5000A (e).
39. Complaint at 1, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
40. Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 at 1270; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559 (1995) (“Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.”).
41. Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
42. Id. at 1286 (rejecting the “power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a
commercial transaction with a third party merely by asserting—as was done in the Act—
that compelling the actual transaction is itself ‘commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce.’”) (emphasis in original).
43. See generally id. at 1288-95.
44. Id. at 1305-06. The District Court also addressed the plaintiffs’ other claim that
the Medicaid expansion was compulsory and, therefore, unconstitutional because the
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
District Court that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause
when it enacted the individual mandate. 45 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to base its Commerce Clause discussion on whether individuals
were active or inactive in the marketplace. 46 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
conducted a multifactor analysis in deference to the unique nature of the
individual mandate question. 47 In the end, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that upholding the mandate under the Commerce Clause would
unconstitutionally expand Congress’ power because doing so would mean
that “the mere fact of an individual’s existence substantially affects interstate
commerce” and, thus, brings that individual under the power of the
Commerce Clause. 48
The Eleventh Circuit also “remain[ed] unpersuaded” by the government’s
alternative argument that the individual mandate was properly enacted under
Congress’ power to tax because the individual mandate to be a mandate with
a penalty rather than a tax. 49 Rejecting the government’s argument that the
mandates revenue-producing element should qualify it as a tax, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the requirement is repeatedly described as a “mandate” in
the legislation itself and that Congress did not intend for the mandate to
function as a tax. 50

states would either be required to accept the “transformed Medicaid program with its new
costs and obligations” or withdraw from the program and lose all federal funds. Id. at
1267. The District Court noted that participation in the program was entirely voluntary
and, as the states’ claim that they would have to accept changes to a voluntary program
did not prove the ACA’s unconstitutionality, the District Court granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment on that count. Id. at 1270 (noting that several states
appeared amici to defend the ACA’s program).
45. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1282 (11th Cir.
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012); id. at 1244-48 (reviewing congressional findings related to the size and
cost of the health care marketplace).
46. Id. at 1286; id. at 1286-87 (also rejecting an economic/noneconomic distinction).
47. Id. at 1295 (describing the scope of the individual mandate as “breathtaking”).
48. Id.; see id. at 1295-97 (dismissing the government’s argument that the unique
nature of the individual mandate serves to limit the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and,
therefore, the reach of the Commerce Clause), 1305 (noting that health insurance has
traditionally been an area of state concern); see also id. at 1267 (agreeing with the
District Court that the Medicaid expansion was “not unduly coercive”).
49. Florida, 648 F.3d at 1314-15 (noting that lower courts overwhelmingly reject the
government’s tax-based argument), 1317-18 (rejecting the government’s argument that
the mandate qualifies a tax because the penalty would be collected by the Internal
Revenue Service).
50. Id. at 1314-15; see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (2012) (“If a taxpayer who is
an applicable individual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable
under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months
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The Supreme Court Upholds the Individual Mandate 51

The Supreme Court also rejected the government’s argument that
Congress had the right to enforce the individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause but ultimately held that the mandate was constitutional as
a tax. 52 In dismissing the Commerce Clause claim, the Court noted that
many individuals do not currently own or plan on purchasing health
insurance and that enforcing the mandate under that clause would effectively
force inactive consumers into the marketplace in order to regulate them. 53
The Court also worried that recognizing Congress’ power to enact the
mandate under the Commerce Clause would lead to an unlimited Commerce
Clause power. 54
After rejecting the government’s Commerce Clause argument, the Court
carefully evaluated the government’s alternative tax argument. “Granting
the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes,” 55 the Court
held that the federal government could enact the mandate under the Taxing
and Spending Clause because reading the statute as imposing a tax was
“reasonable.” 56 The Court specifically noted that a tax is the only penalty
for declining to buy health insurance. 57 The Court further noted that the
mandate was “plainly designed to expand health insurance coverage” but
reasoned that the government was well within its rights to enact a tax that
influenced the conduct of individual consumers. 58

. . . there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures . . . .)
(emphasis added).
51. The Court also addressed the Medicaid expansion, striking down that portion of
the ACA because it unconstitutionally coerced states into expanding their Medicaid
programs. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012); see id. at
2602 (noting that Congress can “create incentives for States to act in accordance with
federal policies” but may not compel their cooperation). But see id. at 2634 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (asserting that the Medicaid expansion was constitutional and not coercive
where the federal government agreed to provide funds and would not withhold other
federal funds for states that declined to participate).
52. Id. at 2591, 2600.
53. Id. at 2587.
54. Id. at 2589. The Court also rejected the government’s argument that the Mandate
was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 2592-93. While the
Court deferred to Congress’ use of “convenient” or “useful” measures to further its
enumerated powers, it rejected the government’s invocation of that Clause as it related to
the individual mandate because it would otherwise grant Congress the right to “reach
beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who
otherwise would be outside of it.” Id. at 2592.
55. Id. at 2594.
56. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
57. Id. at 2593-94.
58. Id. at 2596; see id. at 2600 (noting that the mandate qualifies as a tax under the
Court’s “narrowest interpretations of the taxing power”).
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Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg penned a concurring
opinion that would have upheld the individual mandate under the Commerce
Clause. 59 Analogizing Congress’ health care overall to the Social Security
System, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the states were unable to control the
rising costs of insurance and only Congress could act at a national level to
address the burden health care placed on the economy. 60 Justice Ginsburg
also reasoned that “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the
uninsured, as a class, substantially affect interstate commerce” and, thus, the
power to act under the Commerce Clause. 61 Justice Ginsburg also rejected
the majority’s suggestion that the mandate encompasses non-consumers that
would ordinarily be outside Congress’ regulation under the Commerce
Clause because everyone will, at some time, purchase insurance or otherwise
participate in the health care marketplace. 62
Justices Scalia, Alito, Breyer, and Thomas dissented and asserted that
Congress overreached its enumerated powers when it passed the ACA. 63
The dissenting justices explained that Congress’ effort to compel individuals
to buy health insurance or pay a penalty went beyond regulating commerce
to actually create commerce by forcing inactive individuals to join the
marketplace. 64 In the justices’ opinion, that mandate stretched far beyond
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. 65 The dissenting justices
further rejected the Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate as a
tax and noted that, even if Congress may have had the power to impose a
tax, it did not enact the mandate under that power. 66 Instead, Congress
imposed a mandate with a “penalty” under the Commerce Clause, a penalty
that could not later be reframed as a “tax” to survive judicial scrutiny. 67
59.
60.

Id. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2612; id. at 2609-11 (discussing the size and complexity of the health care
marketplace)
61. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (noting that the “inability to pay for a significant
portion of that consumption drives up market prices, foists costs on other consumers, and
reduces market efficiency and stability”).
62. Id. at 2618; id. at 2621 (rejecting the requirement that an individual be active in
the marketplace in order to fall under the Commerce Clause) (quoting Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)).
63. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
64. Id. at 2644 (“[W]hen Congress provides that (nearly) all citizens must buy an
insurance contract . . . it directs the creation of commerce.”).
65. Id. at 2648 (“[Young people] are quite simply not participants in that market, and
cannot be made so (and thereby subjected to regulation) by the simple device of defining
participants to include all those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase the
goods or services covered by the mandated insurance.”).
66. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2651.
67. Id. at 2653; id. at 2662 (further rejecting the Medicaid expansion because it
requires full participation from the states and uses federal funds to compel that
participation). Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent to criticize the court’s use of the
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Reaction to NFIB v. Sebelius

The Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate was largely
heralded by those who consider the mandate as the cornerstone of the
ACA, 68 though the Court’s Commerce Clause and tax discussions drew
sharp responses. 69 Some noted with approval that the active/inactive
distinction was “novel,” 70 although observers who considered the new test
“ultimately successful” were matched by those who rejected the Court’s
categories. 71 Legal observers declared outright that there “is little doubt that
[Sebelius] marks a doctrinal turn that can restrain congressional power” and
future efforts by Congress to regulate the marketplace may be stymied by
the Court’s new analytical framework. 72 Others complained that Court did
not appreciate the breadth and pervasiveness of the health care market in
rejecting Congress’ attempts to regulate insurance. 73
Commentators quickly seized on the Court’s tax discussion as a departure
from traditional jurisprudence and others suggested that “Congress’s Taxing
Power has been extended to historical new bounds.” 74 While some
embraced the expansive view of the Taxing Clause, other commentators
questioned the wisdom of “taxing inactivity” and worried that the Court had

“substantial effects” test to consider arguments related to the Commerce Clause. Id. at
2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
68. There was some suggestion at the time that Chief Justice Roberts decided to
uphold the mandate under the Taxing and Spending Clause to rehabilitate the Court’s
image after it was repeatedly characterized as partisan and political. Stephen M.
Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case
(NFIB v Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335, 348 (2013) (“By unexpectedly reaching this
ostensibly liberal result-upholding the ACA-Roberts will likely shield the Court from
intense political scrutiny and criticism for the near future.”).
69. Though it will not be discussed here, the Court’s rejection of the Medicare
expansion created similarly powerful reactions. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Coercion,
Conditions, and Commandeering: A Brief Note on the Medicaid Holding of NFIB v.
Sebelius, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 84 (2014) (describing the Court’s Medicaid
decision as “incoherent”).
70. Matthew J. Lindsay, Federalism and Phantom Economic Rights in NFIB v.
Sebelius, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 687, 702 (2014).
71. Lindsay, supra note 70, at 702.
72. Feldman, supra note 68, at 343.
73. Lindsay, supra note 70, at 701 (“Whether one defines the relevant market
broadly, as the consumption of health care; somewhat more narrowly, as the financing of
health care; or still more discretely, as health care insurance, each affects interstate
commerce in a proximate and palpable way.”).
74. Christopher L. Richard, Balancing Liberty and Healthcare Access: Sebelius on
Taxing Inactivity; 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 141, 152 (2013); see also id. at 151
(describing the ACA as “gutted to some extent” by the Court’s decision); Lindsay, supra
note 70, at 689 (noting that “few predicted” that the Court’s decision would turn on
Congress’ power to tax).
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granted Congress unlimited taxing power. 75 Specifically, scholars described
the Court’s decision as helping Congress circumvent its enumerated powers
and “resort[ing] to the taxing power to achieve what it could not achieve by
other means.” 76 Still others challenged the wisdom of approving legislation
under the Taxing Clause when that was not how Congress originally
characterized the mandate. 77 While the Court distinguished the mandate as a
tax rather than a penalty, commentators worried that the decision gave little
guidance on where the line should be drawn. 78
II.

BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. AND CONTRACEPTION
COVERAGE
A.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the ACA

“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion.” 79
In Employment Division v. Smith, 80 the Supreme Court held that facially
neutral laws that in effect incidentally burdened free religious practice do not
contravene the Free Exercise Clause. 81 In response, Congress enacted the
RFRA “[i]n order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty.” 82 The
government cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even
when the burden is caused by a generally applicable rule. 83 If the
government does substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, that
person is exempt from the law unless the government can demonstrate that

75. Richard, supra note 74, at 153; Matthew A. Melone, The Pundits Doth Protest
Too Much: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and the Future of
the Taxing Power, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1208 (2012) (describing the individual
mandate as a tax “imposed for merely existing”).
76. Melone, supra note 75, at 1210 (suggesting, however, that there remain some
meaningful limitations on the taxing power).
77. Brett W. Hastings, Taxation Without Limitation: The Prohibited Pretext Doctrine
v. the Sebelius Theory, 15 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 229, 240 (2013) (arguing that
Sebelius “grants Congress the ability to simply ignore violations of constitutional
provisions so long as the associated law can reasonably be interpreted as a tax”).
78. Melone, supra note 75, at 1205.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012); see also id. at § 2000bb-1(b); Scott W.
Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 589, 605-06 (2014); Jeremy M. Christiansen, Note, The Word “Person” Includes
Corporations: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects both For and
Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623, 623 (2013).
80. 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990) (altering the test for free exercise of religion claims
used in prior Supreme Court precedent).
81. Id. at 882-90.
82. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
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the application of the burden to that person is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest, and that it is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest. 84
Under the ACA, “[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum
provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements
for 85 . . . with respect to women, such additional preventive care and
screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration.” 86 Any employer with 50 or
more full-time employees must offer a health insurance plan that provides
minimum essential coverage or be fined $100 per day for each employee
who qualifies as an affected “individual.” 87
B.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius

David Green, founder of Hobby Lobby, Inc. and his wife Barbara, and
their three children, Steve Green, President of Hobby Lobby, Inc. Mart
Green, founder and CEO of Mardel, and Darsee (Green) Lett filed suit on
behalf of the corporations and in their individual capacity. 88 The Greens run
both businesses through a management trust which requires trustees to sign a
statement of faith and to maintain a walk with the Lord Jesus Christ. 89 Each
Green is a trustee. 90 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., an S Corporation, 91 has over
500 arts and crafts stores with about 13,000 full-time employees. 92 Mardel,
Inc. is a Christian bookstore and educational supply store with thirty-five
stores in seven states with about 400 employees. 93
The Greens are Christian, and operate their companies in accordance with
their faith. 94 Both companies are not open on Sunday in accordance with
their Christian faith. 95 Hobby Lobby, Inc. purchases full-page newspaper
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a).
Id. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b) (2012).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1122 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. According to the Internal Revenue Service, “S corporations are corporations
that elect to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their
shareholders
for
federal
tax
purposes.”
IRS,
S
Corporations
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/S-Corporations (last
updated Nov. 12, 2014); see 26 U.S.C. § 1361.
92. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1122.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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ads welcoming others to “know Jesus as their Lord and Savior,” and does
not engage in business activities that encourage alcohol use. 96 The Greens
provide health insurance to the employees of the two companies, however
because of their Christian faith they believe that life begins at conception, 97
they cannot provide coverage for drugs and devices they believe cause
abortions.
Furthermore, their insurance historically never covered
contraceptive drugs and devices that could terminate a pregnancy. 98 The
government did not dispute the sincerity of their beliefs. 99
The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius 100 challenged the
regulations that required employers to cover four of the twenty FDA
approved methods of birth control, 101 because those four could prevent a
fertilized egg from implanting. 102 FDA approved methods of birth control
not found objectionable to the plaintiffs include the barrier method of a
female condom, a diaphragm with spermicide, a sponge with spermicide, a
cervical cap with spermicide, spermicide alone, oral contraceptives
including a combined pill, a progestin only pill, an extended/continuous use
pill, a patch, a vaginal contraceptive ring, and a progestin implant. 103
Methods deemed objectionable include emergency contraception including
Plan B, a pill that blocks the hormone progesterone, and intrauterine devices
(IUDs) that prevent sperm from reaching a fertilized egg. 104 According to
the FDA, emergency contraception with the hormone progestin works
96.
97.
98.

Id..
Id. at 1122, 1125.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (W.D. Okla.
2012), rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). But see Complaint at 14, Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV–12–1000–HE)
(acknowledging that their insurances policies covered two of the challenged drugs prior
to the passage of the ACA and that plaintiffs excluded those drugs once they reexamined
their policies and became aware of the coverage for the first time).
99. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125.
100. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
101. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123, 1124-25. The plaintiffs only objected to four of
the twenty methods: two intrauterine devices, Plan B (a morning after pill), and Ella (a
week after pill). Id. at 1123. According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]he government does
not articulate why accommodating such a limited request fundamentally frustrates its
goals.” Id. at 1144.
102. Id. at 1124-25.
103. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123.
104. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123; see Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/
freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Aug. 27, 2013).
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mainly by stopping the release of an egg, but may also prevent fertilization
of the egg or implantation of the fertilized egg. 105 The Plan B pill that stops
the hormone progesterone works mainly by stopping or slowing the release
of an egg but may also change the lining of the womb, which prevents
implantation of a fertilized egg. 106 The IUD works by preventing the sperm
from reaching or fertilizing the egg, but may also prevent a fertilized egg
from attaching to the uterus. 107
Since they are for-profit, Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not fall into any of
the exceptions, for less than fifty employees, 108 for a grandfathered plan, 109
or for a religious employer. 110 Hobby Lobby stood to be fined $1.3 million
per day for failure to provide the four forms of preventative care they
objected to. 111 Anticipating potential significant financial loss, the Greens
filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds that their First
Amendment rights and rights under RFRA were violated. 112
The District Court held that the corporations lack free exercise rights and
the plaintiffs were unlikely to establish a constitutional violation. 113 The

105. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013).
106. Id.; see NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Levonorgestrel, MEDLINEP LUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a610021.html (last updated Oct. 01,
2010) (stating that levonorgestrel may change the lining of the uterus).
107. Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.ht
m (last updated Aug. 27, 2013).
108. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
109. Supra note 18 and accompanying text. Prior to the enactment of the mandate,
Hobby Lobby did cover emergency contraceptives, but upon discovery of this, Hobby
Lobby excluded those drugs. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d
1278, 1286 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Complaint at
14, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-121000-HE). The district court stated that this was only a mistake by Hobby Lobby, and
the government does not dispute that Hobby Lobby has excluded emergency
contraceptives. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. Thus, Hobby Lobby argued that
it was only asking to preserve the status quo, although they did not fall under the
grandfathering clause. Id. Hobby Lobby is self-insured and elected not to maintain their
grandfathered status before the contraceptive requirement was proposed. Hobby Lobby,
723 F.3d at 1124.
110. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
111. The fine is $100 per day for each person not covered. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1)
(2012). With 13,000 individuals insured, both men and women, Hobby Lobby would
have faced nearly $475 million per year in fines. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125.
112. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. at 1283, 1285.
113. Id. at 1288.
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Court reasoned that while corporations have some constitutional rights, such
as free speech rights, individual and corporate constitutional rights are not
identical. 114 Additionally, the District Court further denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate
a probability of success on their RFRA claim, despite RFRA not defining the
term “person.” 115 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a motion for an injunction pending appeal. 116
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
denial of the preliminary injunction, holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel
were entitled to bring RFRA claims, as they “established a likelihood of
success that their rights under this statute [were] substantially burdened by
the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and have established an irreparable
harm.” 117 While the Court of Appeals unanimously held that Hobby Lobby
and Mardel had standing to sue, 118 the court fractured on other issues. 119 A
majority of five of the eight circuit judges reversed the district court’s ruling
that Hobby Lobby and Mardel did not demonstrate a likelihood of success
on their RFRA claim, and held that Hobby Lobby satisfied the first prong of
the preliminary injunction test, and remanded on the other two prongs. 120 A
plurality of four, however, would have also held that the other prongs, the
balance of equities and the public interest, were also satisfied. 121

114. See id.; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364
(2010) (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political
speech.”).
115. Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. at 1291, 1296-97.
116. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 120-6294, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
26741 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (order denying preliminary injunction), aff’d 133 S. Ct.
641 (2012).
117. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
118. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1121 (“[T]hree judges would . . . hold that the Greens
have standing to bring to RFRA and Free Exercise claims and that a preliminary
injunction should be granted on their RFRA claim … [but] would also find that the AntiInjunction Act is not jurisdictional and that the government has forfeited reliance.”). The
Court’s disposition consisted of six additional concurring and dissenting opinions. Id. at
1116, 1121 n.1.
119. Id. at 1128.
120. Id.
121. Id. The appeals court remanded to the district court to decide the other two
factors determining whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction. Id.at 1121. The
Court of Appeals concluded that both Hobby Lobby and Mardel had standing because
they faced an imminent financial loss due to the mandate. Id. at 1126. On remand on
July 19, 2013, the District Court granted the preliminary injunction. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-12-1000-HE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107248, at *5
(W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013).
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The appellate court decided, on the merits, whether the closely held, for
profit, corporations were persons under the RFRA. 122 Since the RFRA does
not define “person,” the Dictionary Act states that in determining the
meaning of any act of Congress, the word “person” includes individuals,
corporations, companies, associations, and firms, among others. 123 The
appellate court was less concerned with this distinction between persons and
corporations, and more concerned with whether the rights do not and should
not turn on a tax status. 124
The court examined the question of whether a corporation’s First
Amendment rights turn upon the tax code. 125 Under the federal tax code,
non-profit corporations organized and operated exclusively for purposes
such as religion, charity, science, and education may qualify for tax
exemptions. 126 For-profit corporations may be closely held, such as the
plaintiffs Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood Specialties, or
publicly traded. 127
The IRS defines closely held corporations as
corporations that are not personal service corporations and in the last half of
the year have had over 50% of their stock held by five or fewer
According to the I.R.S. for-profit, publicly traded
individuals. 128
corporations, are made up of primarily stocks and are publically traded on
one or more established securities markets in the United States or qualified
foreign exchanges. 129 So while the majority of the Supreme Court kept the

122.
123.

Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1128.
Id. at 1129 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)); see generally, Alan J. Meese and Nathan
B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit
Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 275-77, 288 (2014);
Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an
Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 71-72 (2014); Case Note, Tenth Circuit Holds
For-Profit Corporate Plaintiffs Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Substantial Burden on
Religious Exercise Claim – Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1025, 1027 (2014); Jeremy Thomas Harbaugh, Case Note, Federal Appellate Court
Holds that a For-Profit Corporation Can Challenge the Contraception Mandate Under
the RFRA, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 692, 692-93, 694 n.31 (2013).
124. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135. In his concurrence, Judge Hartz asserted that all
corporations fall within First Amendment Free Exercise and RFRA protection. Id. at
1147 (Hartz, J., concurring); see generally, Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 41-43 (2014).
125. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1127-28, 1135.
126. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
127. Mary Pazanowski, For-Profits, Closely Held Corporations Can Opt Out of
Contraceptive
Mandates,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(July
1,
2014),
http://www.bna.com/forprofit-closely-held-n17179891700/.
128. IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., Corporations, Pub. No. 542, 3 (Rev. Mar. 2012),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p542.pdf; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.883-2(d)(3)
(2014).
129. 26 C.F.R. § 1.883-2(a) (2014).
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ruling narrowly tailored to closely-held corporations, the Tenth Circuit
stated in Conestoga Wood Specialties that the Internal Revenue Code should
not be determinative. 130 The focus, perhaps, should be on the religious
beliefs and not the tax structure, and as a practical matter, it is harder to get a
publicly-traded corporation to have a religious purpose. 131
C.

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius

The Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius 132 case is similar to
Hobby Lobby, 133 except that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
unlike the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, upheld the denial of the
preliminary injunction. 134
The Hahn family, devout Mennonite
Christians, 135 own Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, a closely held
for-profit corporation, which makes custom wood cabinet doors and
components, 136 and employ about 950 people. 137 Conestoga makes
charitable contributions according to their religious beliefs, and the
corporation adheres to the Hahn Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human
Life. 138 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation’s health plan does not
cover contraceptive prescriptions or drugs that can be used to abort a
pregnancy. 139
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation and its five owners moved for a
preliminary injunction against the ACA regulation requiring employee
health insurance coverage for the twenty approved contraceptives, 140

130. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2760, 2764 (2014); Hobby
Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135.
131. Ilya Somin, Can People “Exercise Religion” Through Publicly Traded
Corporations?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/12/can-people-exercise-religion-through-publicly-tradedcorporations/.
132. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2013), aff’d
sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
133. See infra, section “Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius,” at 3-19, and
accompanying endnotes, at 101-133.
134. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013).
135. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764.
136. About,
Our
Story,
CONESTOGA
WOOD
SPECIALTIES
CORP.,
http://www.conestogawood.com/about-conestoga/our-story (last visited Dec. 02, 2014).
137. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764.
138. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03, 403 n.5.
139. Id. at 403.
140. Id. at 400-01.
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specifically those four which could cause an abortion. 141 In a case of first
impression 142 the plaintiffs challenged the ACA regulations on First
Amendment 143 and RFRA 144 grounds. Plaintiffs in Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. analogized their First Amendment Free Exercise claim to
the First Amendment Free Speech claim, which the Supreme Court approved
in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. 145 The District Court
in Conestoga Wood Specialties, however, did not accept the plaintiffs’
analogy reasoning that the two provisions of the First Amendment, the Free
Speech Clause and the Free Exercise of Religion Clause, differ. 146 The
District Court denied the motion for the preliminary injunction. 147 The
District Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause is for individual religious
freedom, and corporations cannot avail themselves of this Constitutional
provision. 148 According to the District Court the Hahn’s first amendment
claim also failed because the regulations are geared towards a legitimate
governmental interest. 149 The RFRA claim was similarly dismissed. 150
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
decision holding that a for-profit corporation cannot engage in protected
religious exercise, either under the First Amendment or the RFRA. 151 The

141. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 390 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J. dissenting), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
142. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 400. The district court stated that neither the
Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided whether a corporation has the religious
rights of individuals. Id. at 406.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
145. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 406. Citizens United, a non-profit corporation
received donations predominantly from individuals but also from some corporations.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). Citizens United
brought declaratory and injunctive action against the Federal Elections Commission to
ensure it did not run afoul of federal election laws. Id. at 321. The Supreme Court held
that corporations have political free speech rights, and that the government may not
suppress political speech because of the speaker’s corporate identity. Id. at 365. The
Supreme Court thus held that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §
441b, was unconstitutional. Id.
146. Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. at 407
147. Id. at 419.
148. Id. at 408 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause is a personal right and not
available to corporations).
149. Id. at 410.
150. Id. at 413.
151. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The appeals court did not need to
decide if a corporation is a person under the RFRA. Id.; Zachary J. Phillipps, Note, Non-
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Court of Appeals addressed the application of the Supreme Court precedent
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. 152 While the Free
Exercise and Free Speech clauses are in close proximity in the First
Amendment, they have historically been treated differently. 153 The Appeals
Court found that while there is free speech precedent to give corporations
this right, there is an absence of case law giving corporations free exercise
rights. 154 Further, the court stated that the Hahn family members, in their
individual capacity, were not likely to succeed on their First Amendment or
RFRA claims. 155 Thus, the denial of the preliminary injunction was
affirmed. 156 The Third Circuit noted the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby
decision, but respectfully disagreed with the Tenth Circuit. 157 The dissent
observed the irony that the majority determined religious rights by the tax
code, with non-profits having an exemption while for-profit corporations
don’t have such rights. 158 The circuit split set the issue up for a Supreme
Court resolution on the issue.
D.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.: The Supreme Court Addresses
Contraception Coverage

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. the Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby and reversed and
remanded Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corp. to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. 159 Justice Alito wrote for the majority and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 160
According to the majority, the key issue was, whether HHS’s requirement
for closely-held corporations to provide health insurance that includes
contraceptives violates the RFRA and the owners’ sincere religious
beliefs. 161 The majority concluded that “a federal regulation’s restriction on

Prophets: Why For-Profit, Secular Corporations Cannot Exercise Religion Within the
Meaning of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. Rev. 39, 58-59 (2014).
152. See generally Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 383-86.
153. Id. at 386.
154. Id. at 384-85. The Citizens United analogy did not appear at Supreme Court oral
arguments or in the Supreme Court decision. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
155. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 389.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 384 n.7.
158. Id. at 390.
159. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
160. Id. at 2758.
161. Id. at 2759.
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the activities of a for-profit closely-held corporation must comply with the
RFRA.” 162
In reaching this conclusion, the majority used the Dictionary Act to find a
definition of “person” for the purpose of the RFRA. 163 Under the Dictionary
Act, the Court found the word “person” includes corporations, companies,
firms, and other business associations. 164 The Court observed that some
lower court judges have suggested that the RFRA does not apply to forprofit corporations, but the Court suggested this suggestion “flies in the face
of modern corporate law.” 165 The majority noted that corporations are
human entities used to “achieve desired ends.” 166
Since the RFRA applied, the Court then determined that the regulation’s
mandate to provide abortion-causing contraception substantially burdens the
plaintiff’s exercise of religion. 167 The Court pointed out in their opinion that
the penalty per employee for failure to provide health insurance is expensive
for the corporations. 168 In an unusual move, the majority rebutted an
argument not espoused by a party to the litigation but raised by Justice
Sotomayor during oral argument. 169 They addressed that the plaintiffs could
pay the penalty and not provide the health insurance that has the offensive
mandate. 170 While the government did not make the argument below,
Justice Sotomayor did raise the issue at oral argument. 171 The majority
found this argument “unpersuasive,” as the parties have religious reasons for
not providing health insurance for their employees. 172

162. Id. at 2775. When deliberating whether a corporation fell within the RFRA’s
definition of “persons,” the majority stated that “[a] corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.” Id. at 2768.
163. Id. at 2768-69; see 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person”).
164. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768-69.
165. Id. at 2756.
166. Id. at 2768.
167. Id. at 2759, 2775. The Court observed that the Hahns and Greens religious
beliefs about how life begins at conception are sincere. Id.
168. Id. at 2770, 2776.
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
170. Id.
171. Id. (Sotomayor, J.) (“But isn’t there another choice nobody talks about, which is
paying the tax, which is a lot less than a penalty and a lot less than - - than the cost of
health insurance at all? These employers could choose not to give health insurance and
pay not that high a penalty - - not that high a tax.”).
172. Id. at 23 (Sotomayor, J.) (“. . . [employers] can just pay a greater salary and let
the employees go in on the exchange.”); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2777 (agreeing with
Justice Sotomayor, the majority stated that approach also costs more because group
health insurance is generally more costly than individual insurance.). In addition to
raising wages to cover the cost of insurance for employees, the plaintiffs would have to
pay the tax penalty for not providing health insurance. Id.
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Since the Court found that the contraceptive mandate relating to the four
objectionable methods did place a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion, the Court had to determine whether the mandate survived the test
for strict scrutiny. 173 The majority assumed that the interest in requiring
cost-free employee access to the four methods of contraceptives in question
was compelling. 174 The Court, however, concluded that the contraceptive
mandate regulations “fail the least-restrictive-means test.” 175 The majority
did not need to reach the First Amendment issues. 176
In Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he stated “freedom means that
all persons have the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator
and a divine law … It means, too, the right to express those beliefs … in the
political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.” 177 Justice
Kennedy suggested that the mandate could be placed on the insurance
company and not the employer. 178
However, Justice Ginsburg strongly dissented, calling the majority’s
ruling a “decision of startling breadth.” 179 Justice Ginsburg stated that the
Court “holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with
partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.” 180
Justice Kennedy, in concurring, stated “the Court’s opinion does not have
the breadth and sweep ascribed to it by the respectful and powerful
dissent.” 181 With respect to Justice Ginsburg, the plaintiffs were closelyheld for profit corporations, and the ruling may or may not extend to all
commercial enterprises. 182
E.

Subsequent Contraception Coverage Litigation

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 183 while
narrowly tailored to cover only closely-held for-profit corporations with
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). Under strict scrutiny, the government needed to prove the
mandate furthered a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
for furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
174. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
175. Id. at 2782.
176. Id. at 2785.
177. Id. at 2785(Kennedy, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2786.
179. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 2760 (majority opinion) (noting the court’s holding does not extend to all
commercial enterprise). C.f. id.at 2787 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (asserting the holding is,
in fact, expansive enough to include commercial enterprise).
183. Id. at 2751.
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sincerely held religious beliefs against the use of four FDA-approved
contraceptives, is sure to spark additional litigation. Shortly after the Hobby
Lobby decision, Wheaton College, a religious non-profit, requested, and was
granted, an injunction pending appeal from the Supreme Court. 184 The
Court decided whether an HHS required form must be completed to request
an exemption from contraceptive coverage, or if written notice to the
government, as Wheaton College used, suffices for exemption from
contraceptive coverage. 185 The Court’s order specifically stated that this is
not an expression of the Court’s views on the merits. 186 However, the
dissent added their analysis concerning the injunction. Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented from the injunction
pending appeal. 187 Justice Sotomayor stated that she strongly disagrees. 188
In addressing Wheaton College’s request for an injunction, Justice
Sotomayor expressed concern over granting relief in relation to a recently
enacted law and published regulations when lower courts had not
adjudicated the merits of the challenge and such relief is “extraordinary and
reserved for the rarest of cases.” 189 The Justice seems to overlook that, these
cases challenging aspects of the ACA and its implementing regulations are
the rarest of cases, pitting Constitutional and statutory religious freedoms
against statutory and regulatory health care mandates.
Further, in Mersino Management Company v. Burwell, 190 for example, the
Court of Appeals for the Six Circuit granted an injunction against the ACA
contraceptive mandate pending appeal. 191 District courts have also granted
preliminary injunctions against the enforcement of the contraceptive
mandate after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby. 192 Permanent

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).
Id. at 2807.
Id.
Id. at 2807-15 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting)
Id. at 2810.
Id.
Order Granting an Injunction Pending Appeal, No. 13-1944 (6th Cir. July 9,

2014).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, No. CIV 14-240-R, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75949 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2014), modified sub nom. Catholic
Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, No. 14-CV-685-R (W.D. Okla. July 1, 2014); Holland v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 2014).
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injunctions have also been granted by district courts in numerous cases, 193
including in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell. 194
Thus, while the Supreme Court decided the issue of the contraceptive
mandate for religious based closely held corporations, this issue is not going
away, and will likely continue to develop as courts and the public wrestle
with the nuances of the Court’s decision. 195 In subsequent cases, it is
suggested, that the focus should be on the religious beliefs, and not the tax
status, of the corporations involved. 196 While it is unlikely that publicly
traded firms have a sincerely held religious belief, the RFRA focuses on
religious beliefs, and tax status can change. 197
In Hobby Lobby, the challenge involved only four of the twenty
contraceptive methods, not all FDA approved contraceptive methods. 198
While this may not be the broad sweep that Justice Ginsburg states, which
could allow corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, to opt out of
“any law” except tax laws, the outcome could well expand in subsequent
Justice Ginsburg further called the majority’s rulings
litigation. 199
“extraordinary religion-based exemptions” which could bring havoc. 200
Lower courts will have to rule on a case-by-case basis on the pending cases
and future cases which may develop on the contraceptive mandate.

193. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-104(EGS)
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2014); Midwest Fastener Corp. v. Burwell, No. 13-0337 (ESH),
(D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2014); Johnson Welded Prods. v. Burwell, No. 13-00609 (ESH), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151306 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2014).
194. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, No. 12-6744 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2,
2014).
195. Emily Pitt Mattingly, “Hobby-Lobby”-ing for Religious Freedom: Crafting the
Religious Employer Exemption to the PPACA, 102 KY. L. J. 183, 201 (2013) (discussing
the “nationwide dissatisfaction with the narrowness of the religious employer
exemption”); see, e.g., Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Burwell, No. CIV.A.
13-0521-CG-C, 2014 WL 2739347, at *3, *6 (S.D. Ala. June 17, 2014) (challenging the
regulation that allows the plaintiff to opt out of providing contraception coverage by
turning that responsibility to a third-party administrator because the act still facilitates
access to contraception in violation of the company’s “sincere religious beliefs”).
196. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
197. Ilya Somin, Can People “Exercise Religion” Through Publicly Traded
Corporations?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/12/can-people-exercise-religion-through-publiclytraded-corporations/; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)-(b) (2012); see also Business
Structures, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/
Business-Structures (last updated Nov. 13, 2014).
198. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
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F. Lingering Questions in the Contraception Coverage Debate
The regulation at issue in Burwell mandating that corporations with
religious beliefs cover all methods of approved birth control should be
explicitly altered to accommodate sincerely-held religious beliefs of closelyheld for profit corporations like Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga. This
would slow the race to the courthouse to get a preliminary or permanent
injunction, and would clarify the issue for all. Justice Kennedy’s suggestion
in the concurrence that the insurance company should cover the types of
birth control objected to by religious employers 201 is inadequate, as
employers are still paying for health insurance that covers these methods,
whether directly or indirectly, and thus there would still be the religious
objection that they could be complicit in providing an abortion, which they
object to on the basis of their religion. 202
The long run effect on corporations who choose for religious purposes not
to provide health insurance for the full range of contraceptives remains to be
seen. There could be employees who choose to work elsewhere, where
these four methods are covered under insurance plans. There could be other
employees who share these values who choose to seek employment there.
There could be customers who choose to shop elsewhere, while there could
also be customers who seek out these stores because they share these values.
However it should be noted that the decision is not as sweeping as it may
appear, as, according to the Tenth Circuit, the contraceptive mandate does
not apply to tens of millions of people, 203 who are under grandfathered
plans, exempt employers for religious reasons, or who work for companies
with less than fifty employees. 204 Furthermore, after the decision, HHS on
July 16, 2014 in a letter to Guam exempted the U.S. territories of Guam,
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern
Mariana Islands, from some aspects of the ACA, at their request. 205 The 4.5

201. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2785-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J.
concurring).
202. See generally, Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Challenges: Religious Liberty and
the HHS Mandate, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 1, 4-5 (2013).
203. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114, 1124, 1143 (10th Cir.
2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). This
number has been put much higher, as high as 190 million people not covered by the
mandate. Editorial, Hooray! The War on Women is Back: The Supreme Court Unleashes
a Wave of Liberal Misinformation, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2014, at A12.
204. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124, 1143.
205. Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
Artemio B. Llagan, Comm’r of Guam Dep’t. of Revenue & Taxation (Jul. 16, 2014),
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/letter-tollagan.pdf.
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million residents of these territories 206 are exempt from certain aspects of the
ACA, such as guaranteed availability and essential health benefits, which
apply to “states” under the statute, but not exempted from other
requirements such as the preventive health screenings at question in this
case. 207
Thus, by deciding that employers in closely-held for profit corporations
do not have to provide the four types of birth control that violate their
religious beliefs, the court opened the door to further litigation. 208 Perhaps a
better solution is exempt these religious employers, for profit and not for
profit, from the requirement to provide the contraceptives deemed
objectionable on the basis of religion.
III.

KING V. BURWELL: LOOKING AHEAD TO THE NEXT ACA CASE
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

The litigation under the ACA on the contraceptive mandate and at least
one other major issue continues at the time of this discussion. 209 In 2014,
two federal appellate courts issued contradictory opinions on whether the
federal health insurance exchange qualifies as an exchange established by
the State under the ACA, setting up this issue for a showdown in the
Supreme Court. 210 On November 7, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
hear King v. Burwell, an ACA case that involved the validity of an IRS
regulation allowing for an individual tax credit for purchasing health
insurance through a federally-established exchange. 211

206. Editorial, Territories Free of ObamaCare: The White House Issues Another
Illegal Exemption, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2014 at A12.
207. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
208. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014); see
generally Karen Gantt, Balancing Women’s Health and Religious Freedom Under the
ACA, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1 (2014) (exploring the various lawsuits filed against
the contraceptive mandate).
209. Abbe Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King – Obamacare Subsidies as
(Nov.
7,
2014,
12:48
PM),
Textualism’s
big
test,
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-king-obamacare-subsidiesas-textualisms-big-test/.
210. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g
granted No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014); King,
759 F.3d at 374-75.
211. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14114, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7428 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2014). 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 states, in pertinent
part, that a taxpayer whose household income is between 100% and 400% of the Federal
poverty line is allowed a premium tax credit if the taxpayer is enrolled in a qualified
health plan “through an Exchange.” 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.36B-2(a), (b)(1) (2013).
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Individual Tax Credits

The ACA states, “each State shall…establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange.” 212 A state may elect to establish an exchange, according to
another section, and if a state does not so elect, the Secretary of HHS shall
establish and operate an exchange within the state. 213 A provision of the
ACA allows for tax credits for those who purchase health insurance
“through an Exchange established by the State.” 214 The IRS has interpreted
this statutory provision broadly to also include individual in states that have
a federal exchange, because the state chose not to establish an exchange. 215
B.

Halbig v. Burwell

On May 2, 2013, individual and corporate plaintiffs filed suit to prevent
the implementation of the IRS’s rule related to tax credits. 216 Without the
rule extending the tax credit to federally-created exchanges, the individual
plaintiffs would have been exempt from the individual mandate and excused
from any fines for noncompliance because of their low incomes. 217 Once
the IRS applied the tax credit to individuals in the District of Columbia
(including the plaintiffs), the total cost of the least expensive qualifying plan
would be less than eight percent of each plaintiff’s income and, therefore,
each plaintiff would be required to purchase an insurance plan or pay a tax
penalty. 218 Similarly, the corporate plaintiffs alleged that, while they
currently were not required to provide health insurance to employees, any
employee who was required to obtain coverage or pay a fine as a result of
the tax credit would also trigger an obligation on plaintiffs’ part to provide
similar plans for their employees. 219 Collectively, the plaintiffs argued that
the plain language of the statute required that only those exchanges created
by the states, and not federally-created exchanges, would be subject to the
tax credit scheme and asked the court to strike down the IRS rule. 220 In
short, plaintiffs in states with a federal exchange challenged the IRS rule

212. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010);
King, 759 F.3d at 364.
213. Affordable Care Act § 1321(c)(1); King, 759 F.3d at 364.
214. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i) (2012); King, 759 F.3d at 364.
215. 26 C.F.R. § 1-36B-2(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014) (defining “Exchange”);
King, 759 F.3d at 364.
216. See generally Complaint, Halbig v. Burwell, 27 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014) (No.
13–623 (PLF), 2014 WL 129023.
217. Id. at 4-5.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 6-7.
220. Id. at 13-14.
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because they did not want to pay the penalty tax for not purchasing health
insurance. 221
The District Court for the District of Columbia declined to do so. 222
Instead, the District Court granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment because the language of the ACA unambiguously granted the IRS
the authority to promulgate the rule. 223 Specifically, the District Court held
that, when viewed in the context of the ACA, the phrase “established by the
State” includes both exchanges established by individual states and
exchanges established by the federal government on behalf of states. 224 The
District Court further noted that other provisions in the ACA and the Act’s
legislative history reflect Congress’ intent to make the tax credits available
to taxpayers who were part of state-created and federally-created
exchanges. 225 Thus, the District Court held that Congress’ intent was clear
and upheld the IRS rule under the first step of the Chevron statutory
interpretation analysis. 226
On January 15, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Halbig
v. Burwell reversed and vacated the IRS regulation since the ACA statute
specifically states exchanges established by the State. 227 Unlike the District
Court, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plain language of the statute
precluded the IRS from extending the tax credit to purchasers in federallycreated exchanges. 228 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit found the phrase
“established by the State” controlling and held that the relevant portion of
the statute “plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those

221. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g granted,
No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014).
222. Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp.3d 1(D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Halbig
v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g granted, No. 14-5018,
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014). The District Court found that
the Anti-Injunction Act applied and barred plaintiffs’ attempt to prevent the collection of
the assessable payment that the District Court deemed a “tax.” Id. at 8-11. The AntiInjunction Act is not the subject of this article and the analysis will instead focus on the
District Court’s alternative decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation
argument.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Id. at 20.
225. See generally id. at 19-24; id. at 24 n.13 (acknowledging that the there was a
“limited legislative record relating to the final version of the bill.”).
226. Id. at 25, 25 n.14 (holding in the alternative that the “IRS Rule must be upheld at
Chevron step two as . . . the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute in promulgating the
Rule was at least permissible.”).
227. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g granted
No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014).
228. Id. at 399.
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established by the federal government.” 229 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with
the lower court’s determination that the legislative history supported the
government’s reading, stating instead that the “scant legislative history” did
not demonstrate Congress’ intent. 230 The D.C. Circuit further reasoned that
its decision was consistent with HHS’s exemptions of the five U.S.
territories as not being “states” for purposes of aspects of the ACA. 231
Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the Department of Justice filed a
petition for rehearing en banc, arguing that the “disruption threatened by the
panel majority’s erroneous interpretation and the direct conflict with King
present a question of ‘exceptional importance’ warranting en banc
consideration.” 232 On September 4, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit vacated its prior decision and granted rehearing en banc. 233 Oral
argument was scheduled for December 17, 2014 but was removed from that
calendar and the case held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in King v. Burwell. 234
C.

King v. Burwell

Plaintiff David King was not eligible for health insurance coverage either
through an employer or through the government, and his income exempted
him from the penalty or tax for not having health insurance. 235 His income
qualified him for a subsidy through a state exchange, but Virginia is not one

229. Id.; see id. at 403-05 (rejecting the government’s arguments that the D.C.
Circuit’s interpretation will lead to “absurd” results and significantly weaken the ACA).
230. Id. at 407-08.
231. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014) (defining “State” as all fifty states and the District
of Columbia); Jason Millman, The Administration Just took Obamacare Away from the
Territories, WASH. POST. (July 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/17/the-administration-just-took-obamacare-away-from-theterritories/; Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., to Gregory R. Francis, Comm’r of the Office of the Lieutenant Gov. of V.I., (July
16,
2014),
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/letter-toFrancis.pdf (addressing concerns about the ACA’s applicability to health insurance issues
in the U.S. territories).
232. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.D.C.
2014) (No. 13–623 (PLF)).
233. Order, Halbig, No. 14-5018, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04,
2014).
234. Per Curiam Order, 758 F.3d 390 (Nov. 11, 2014); see Lyle Denniston, Health
Care Subsidies Issue Rushed to Court (FURTHER UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 31,
2014, 11:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/health-care-subsidies-issuesrushed-to-court/ (noting that the en banc rehearing process “a process that could take
months, at least.”).
235. King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (E.D.V.A. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 14-114, 2014 U.S. LEXIS
7428 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2014).
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of the states that set up an exchange. 236 Mr. King did not want to procure
health insurance and did not want to pay the penalty, but with the broadly
written IRS rule that gives a subsidy for any “exchange,” he would either
have to procure health insurance or pay the tax. 237 Mr. King and other
plaintiffs filed suit contending that the IRS rule exceeds the IRS’s regulatory
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the Administrative
Procedure Act. 238
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue but dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. 239 The
District Court found that the IRS Rule carried out Congress’ clear intent to
extend the tax credit to individuals who participated in federally-created
exchanges. 240 Construing the statute as a whole, the District Court reasoned
that the tax credit provision should be read to apply to all exchanges because
“it furthers Congress’s intent to provide affordable health insurance for
all.” 241 The District Court also looked to the trial court’s decision in Halbig
v. Burwell and noted that “there is no evidence in the legislative record that
[Congress] . . . ever entertained the idea of conditioning federal tax credits
upon state participation.” 242 In the alternative, the District Court also held,
even if the statutory language was ambiguous as to Congress’ intent, that the
IRS Rule is a reasonable interpretation of that provision of the ACA and,
therefore, worth of deference from the courts. 243
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in King v. Burwell 244 held that
the IRS regulation is a permissible exercise of agency discretion, affirming
the district court. 245 After affirming the holding that the parties have
standing, 246 the Court of Appeals turned to the merits. Applying the twostep test of administrative deference from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 247 the Court of Appeals found under the first
step that Congress did not speak definitively to the question; the statue is

236.

King, 759 F.3d at 365. The District of Columbia also has an exchange. Id. at

364.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 365.
Id. (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2014)).
King, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 422-24, 432.
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 14-114, 2014
U.S. LEXIS 7428 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2014).
245. Id. at 363; King v. Burwell, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 432 (E.D.V.A. 2014).
246. King, 759 F.3d at 366.
247. Chevron v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); King,
759 F.3d at 367.

2015]

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

29

ambiguous and can be interpreted more than one way. 248 The Court then
applied the second prong of the test and considered whether the agency’s
rule is based upon a permissible interpretation of the statute. 249 Finding that
the ACA permits the IRS rule to give tax credits for insurance purchased on
the federal exchange, 250 the Court of Appeals upheld the IRS rule as a
permissible interpretation of the statute. 251
The Supreme Court is expected to make a decision on this case by the end
of June 2015. 252 If the Court limits the holding to the statutory language of
exchanges run by the state, the Congress could amend the ACA section to
state “exchanges” or “exchanges run by the state or federal government.” 253
When enacting the law, in hindsight, that distinction should have been made.
The litigation continues under the Affordable Care Act, and is expected to
continue as new issues emerge. 254
D.

Predicting the Supreme Court’s Decision and Offering a Simple
Legislative Fix

Following the Supreme Court’s ACA decisions related to the individual
mandate and contraception coverage, King v. Burwell addresses the tension
between efforts to compel compliance with the individual mandate while
simultaneously excusing larger entities such as states and corporations from
complying with large swathes of the Act. As noted by the court in NFIB v.
Sebelius, the goals of the ACA could only be achieved with national
compliance because a patchwork approach to health care reform would
simply be ineffective. 255 At the same time, Congress carved out exceptions
for large employers and other key players in the insurance marketplace to
help ensure that the ACA would pass. 256 The Court in Hobby Lobby

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

King, 759 F.3d at 372.
Id. (citing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
Id. at 373-75.
Id. at 376.
David Bastawrous, Gruber and Supreme Court Thrust Obamacare into the
Spotlight, FOXNEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/special-reportbret-baier/blog/2014/11/13/gruber-and-supreme-court-thrust-obamacare-spotlight.
253. Such disposition would amend the ACA. See Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111148, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 173 (2010). Including how refundable credits are
applied. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1-36B-2(a)(1);
45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2014) (defining “Exchange”).
254. Steve Benen, House Republicans Finally File Anti-Obama Lawsuit, MSNBC
(Nov. 21, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/houserepublicans-finally-file-anti-obama-lawsuit.
255. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012).
256. Id. at 2612 (explaining that Congress discarded a single-payer system that would
have left “little, if any, room for private enterprise” and instead chose a system that
“retains a robust role for private insurers and state governments.”); see Group Health
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articulated a broad exception to contraception coverage, 257 potentially
opening up the door for more religious-based ACA exemption claims. 258
King v. Burwell is the inevitable clash of those two ideas and a decision
vacating the IRS Rule would lead to a curious result: individuals would be
compelled to participate in federally-created exchanges without receiving
the same benefits (here, a tax credit) that their counterparts in state-created
exchanges receive as a statutory right.
One must ask whether striking down the IRS rule would serve Congress’
ultimate goals in creating these exchanges and building this interlocking
group of tax-based incentives. The appellate courts in both King v. Burwell
and Halbig v. Burwell seemed to have clear understanding of Congress’
intent in mandating individual participation. 259
Legal scholars and commentators agree that the case will have a
significant impact on the ACA, regardless of the ruling. 260 Some suggest
that striking down the IRS regulations would effectively undermine the
entire individual mandate 261 while still others suggest that such a result
would inevitably show that the ACA is “unworkable” without affirmative
cooperation from the states. 262 Some law professors have characterized the
statutory language as a “drafting error” that the Court should be able to
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reh’g granted, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014); King v.
Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 420, 431 (E.D.V.A. 2014), aff’d sub nom. King v. Burwell, 759
F.3d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, No. 14-114, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 7428 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2014).
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PM),
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correct. 263 If the Supreme Court rejects the regulation, individuals in less
than a third of the states will actually be eligible for the tax credit. 264 For
others who currently rely on that credit to make health insurance affordable,
losing the credit may make the choice between maintaining now-expensive
insurance and paying a lower fine a difficult choice to make. 265
The Court’s discussion in Sebelius yields some clues as to how the Court
may approach the question. There, the court recognized the ACA’s
overarching policy goals and the importance of requiring full participation
for the system to be effective. 266 As many have noted, 267 the Court was
willing to look beyond the text of the statute that referred to a “penalty” to
find instead that Congress assessed a tax. 268 That approach seemed to ignore
the plain language of the statute 269 and Congress’ decision to characterize
the payment as a penalty. 270 Arguably, the Court reached that result based
both on their understanding of the penalty within the overall ACA
framework and the importance of the individual mandate to the law’s
success. 271 Similarly, the Court here could choose to cast aside the
plaintiffs’ reading of the phrase “through an Exchange established by the

263. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Yes, the Federal Exchance Can Offer Premium Tax
Credits, HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Sept 11, 2011), http://www.healthreform
watch.com/2011/09/11/yes-the-federal-exchange-can-offer-premium-tax-credits/
(suggesting that “[i]t is . . . highly unlikely that the House, whose bill included only a
federal exchange, would have approved a bill that only provided tax credits through state
exchanges but not through the federal exchange”).
264. King, 759 F.3d at 364 (noting that only sixteen states and the District of
Columbia have established state exchanges).
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State” 272 and instead rely on the framework of the ACA as a whole to
determine that Congress only could have meant to extend the credit to all
taxpayers, regardless of whether their exchange was created by a state or by
the federal government for that state. 273 Further, the District Court in both
cases explicitly acknowledged that the credit is a cornerstone of the ACA
and, like the individual mandate, the ACA is unlikely to survive in an
effective form without it. 274 Thus, looking back to the other tax-based ACA
case taken up by the Supreme Court, there is reason to believe that the Court
will read beyond any drafting issues to find a reasonable reading that shores
up the health care exchange system.
At the same time, the Court has willingly carved out broad exceptions in
the ACA as it relates to contraceptive coverage and it may do the same here
when confronted with the broader constitutional questions. While the Court
would do well to narrow its holding in Hobby Lobby, 275 its analysis there
may also illuminate how it will address the upcoming tax credit question.
Notably, the Court declined to credit the suggestion made by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the contraception coverage question be
decided on the basis of taxation characteristics 276 and instead addressed the
broader constitutional claims. 277 That decision may very well signal that,
now that the Court has upheld the individual mandate, which is a key
provision of the ACA, it is unwilling to advance further in service of the
statute. 278 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that challenges
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to a tax credit that would compel an otherwise exempt individual to purchase
health insurance is not a divisive issue on par with contraception coverage.
The justices who were willing to excuse religious corporations from
providing contraception coverage may very well decline to intervene here.
In the event that Congress is willing to take up the cause, the easiest way
to avoid this would be to amend the relevant ACA section to apply to “all
Exchanges” rather than an “Exchanges established by the State.” 279 By
pinning the tax credit section to a portion of the statute that explicitly
addresses federally-created exchanges, Congress could remove the
ambiguity from that portion of the statute. 280 The current Congress,
however, likely will not pass such an amendment while the Fourth Circuit’s
decision still stands. 281 Moreover, Congress is currently working to pass
major legislation on topics unrelated to the ACA 282 before the 114th
Congress is sworn in this January. 283 While the issue is of utmost
importance to the ACA, there appears to be little desire to take up the sword
for arguably the most controversial piece of legislation of President Obama’s
administration. Thus, challenges under this enormous federal statute and its
implementing regulations are not abating any time soon.

279. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012) (section of the statute incorporated into
the tax credit provision that only refers to “[e]ach State” establishing an exchange), with
id. § 18041(c)(1) (discussing how the Department of Health and Human Services may
establish “such Exchange” if a state fails to do so).
280. Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 13-623(PLF), 2014 WL 129023, *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 15,
2014), rev’d sub nom. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated,
reh’g granted, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 04, 2014).
281. Michael Hiltzik, Will the Supreme Court Move America Closer to Two-Class
Healthcare?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.latimes.com
/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-twoclass-healthcare-20141110-column.html#page=1
(noting
that congressional Republicans have declined to take up ACA-related legislation except
for proposals to repeat it completely). But see Michael Hiltzik, The Congressional Deal
that Could Save Obamacare, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014, 7:38 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-congressional-deal-that-could-saveobamacare-20141110-column.html (suggesting that Democrats could fix the tax credit
“wording glitch” by offering to undo the medical device tax and the employer mandate).
282. See Billy House & Rachel Roubein, As Lame-Duck Session Begins, Congress to
Focus on Approp[riations], Ebola, and Islamic State, NAT’L J. (Nov. 9, 2014), available
at
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/as-lame-duck-session-begins-congress-tofocus-on-approps-ebola-and-islamic-state-20141109.
283. Judy Schneider & Michael L. Koempel, Cong. Research Serv., RL30725, The
First Day of a New Congress: A Guide to Proceedings on the House Floor 1 (2014).

34

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. 31:1

CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act ushered in sweeping changes in America’s
health insurance and health care law. 284 Litigation has ensued, reaching the
Supreme Court twice at the time of this writing, with a third decision
expected in 2015. 285 While the Supreme Court clarified the issue for the
parties in Burwell, litigation is expected to continue on that, and other issues,
related to the Affordable Care Act. 286
While the Burwell decision clarified the issue of exemption from the
contraceptive mandate for religious-based closely-held for-profit
corporations such as Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties,
the litigation continues on this issue, and other issues, such as the IRS rule
allowing tax credits for health insurance purchased through “exchanges.” 287
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